WHO AFRO weekly situation report 3

Data as of 2026-05-31
Published
May 31, 2026
Published by WHO, republished here as text
This is the text layer of a PDF published by the WHO Regional Office for Africa, extracted without change and laid out as the PDF lays it out. The record of authority is the PDF in IRIS.

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BUNDIBUGYO VIRUS DISEASE OUTBREAK
Democratic Republic of the Congo | Uganda
Weekly External Situation Report 03, Data as of 31 May 2026

Summary
CFR (%)
Total Cases Total Deaths
Confirmed Confirmed Probable Probable Confirmed
Country (Confirmed (Confirmed
Cases Deaths Cases Deaths &
& Probable) & Probable)
Probable
1
Democratic
Republic of the
Congo
321 48 - - 321 48 15.0%
2
Uganda 11 1 1 1 12 2 16.7%
1
Reported case counts should be interpreted with caution, as ongoing epidemiological and laboratory investigations continue to
reclassify suspected cases on a daily basis. While those testing positive are reclassified as confirmed cases and those testing
negative are discarded and removed from the case count, 116 suspected cases remain pending reclassification and are not yet
reflected in the current totals.
2
All suspected cases in Uganda have been reclassified following investigations; only confirmed and probable cases are reported.

Event description
The Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to intensify, with
sustained transmission, expansion into new health zones, and increasing risks of national and regional spread. In
Uganda, additional cases have also been reported, all linked to previous cases or to travel from the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. Since our previous update (Sitrep #2) with data as of 24 May 2026, the Democratic Republic
of the Congo has reported an additional 216 laboratory-confirmed cases, including an additional 38 confirmed
deaths. The outbreak has expanded from 13 to 23 affected health zones, across Ituri (15), North Kivu (seven), and
South Kivu (one) provinces. In Ituri province, 15 of the 36 health zones are now affected, with Aungba, Damas, Gety,
Komanda, Lita, Logo, and Mangala being the newly affected health zones. In North Kivu province, the detection of
confirmed cases in Beni and Kyondo health zones has increased the number of affected health zones to seven out of
35.

Democratic Republic of the Congo
As of 31 May 2026, a total of 321 laboratory-confirmed cases, including 48 confirmed deaths, have been reported
across the three affected provinces of Ituri, North Kivu and South Kivu in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Of
the 1077 previous suspected cases, including 246 suspected deaths reported to date, those testing positive have
been reclassified as confirmed cases, while those with negative laboratory results have been discarded and removed
from the case count. A total of 116 suspected cases remain under investigation and are not yet reflected in the
reported totals. The outbreak remains heavily concentrated in Ituri province, which accounts for 299 confirmed cases
(93.1%), followed by North Kivu (19 confirmed cases), and South Kivu (three confirmed cases). Within Ituri Province,
the most affected health zones are Bunia, Rwampara, Mongbwalu, and Nyankunde.

A total of 3200 contacts had been identified for follow-up across the three affected provinces as of 29 May, of whom
967 (30.2%) were reportedly seen within the previous 24 hours. Contact tracing performance remained particularly

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weak in Ituri Province, where major transmission hotspots such as Bunia, Mongbwalu, and Rwampara reported no
contacts followed up during the reporting period, while substantially higher follow-up coverage was achieved in
North Kivu Province (90.7%). The low follow-up rate highlights persistent challenges in the outbreak epicentre, where
insecurity, population mobility, and operational constraints continue to hamper effective contact tracing.

Among 168 laboratory-confirmed cases with available demographic information, 54.8% (92) are males and 45.2%
(76) are females. Adults aged 18 – 49 years accounted for the majority of cases, with the highest burden observed
among persons aged 30 – 49 years, followed by those aged 18 – 29 years. Children aged 0–4 years and adults aged
50 years and above accounted for a smaller proportion of cases, although these groups may remain at increased risk
of severe outcomes and mortality. The predominance of cases among economically active adults, particularly males,
is consistent with the outbreak's association with mining activities and population mobility corridors in affected
areas.

Uganda
In Uganda, the outbreak remains epidemiologically linked to transmission originating in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, with evidence of both imported infections and secondary transmission among contacts and healthcare
workers. Since the previous update, Uganda has reported five additional cases, including four confirmed cases and
one probable case who died.
As of 30 May 2026, Uganda has reported 12 cases (11 confirmed and one probable), including two deaths (one
confirmed and one probable), spanning two districts (Kampala and Wakiso) within the Kampala Metropolitan Area.
Of these, five are healthcare workers. A total of 642 contacts have been identified and are under follow-up. Among
the cases reported, 66.7% (eight) are males and 33.3% (four) are females.

Adults aged 31 – 50 years account for the majority of cases (58.3%; 7). Three cases were reported among persons
aged 51 – 59 years and two among those aged 21 – 30 years. No cases have been reported among children or
adolescents. The age distribution indicates that transmission has primarily affected working-age adults, consistent
with the cross-border travel patterns and occupational exposures reported among confirmed cases.

Risk Assessment

The World Health Organization (WHO) continues to assess the national risk associated with the outbreak as very high
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, high at the regional level including in Uganda, and low at the global level.
The outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is occurring in a complex humanitarian context with chronic
insecurity, large-scale population displacement, limited access to health services, and underfunded humanitarian
operations. The affected provinces host millions of internally displaced persons, face recurrent attacks on
humanitarian workers, and experience high levels of food insecurity and vulnerability, complicating surveillance and
response activities.

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Figure 1. Weekly trends of confirmed and probable cases of Bundibugyo virus disease in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo and Uganda by epidemiological week of symptom onset3, epidemiological weeks 14 – 22, 2026

3
Only 181 confirmed cases with available dates of symptom onset were included in the analysis for the Democratic Republic of the Congo; therefore,
the epi curve does not represent all 321 confirmed cases reported to date.

Figure 2. Distribution of confirmed and probable cases of Bundibugyo virus disease in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo and Uganda by age and sex group4, data as of 31 May 2026

Only 168 confirmed cases with available dates of symptom onset were included in the age and sex analysis for the Democratic Republic of the
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Congo; therefore, the graph does not represent all 321 confirmed cases reported to date.

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Figure 3. Geographical distribution of confirmed and probable cases of Bundibugyo virus disease cases in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, as of 31 May 2026

Public health response
Coordination
• The continental Incident Management Support Team (IMST), led by WHO and the Africa Centres for Disease
Control and Prevention (Africa CDC), and involving United Nations agencies, technical institutions, and health
partners, remains activated to coordinate strategic and operational support to affected and at-risk countries.
A continental response plan and resource mobilization framework are being operationalized to strengthen
preparedness and response capacities. Coordination meetings and emergency briefings continue to be held
routinely.

• In both the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, national Incident Management Systems (IMS)
remain activated, with coordination structures functioning at national and subnational levels, supported by
WHO, Africa CDC, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the International Organization for Migration
(IOM), Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), International Medical Corps, Samaritan’s Purse, other organizations
within the United Nations system, and other operational partners.

• WHO Director-General Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, accompanied by senior WHO leadership, including
the WHO Regional Director for Africa and the Executive Director of the WHO Health Emergencies
Programme, conducted a high-level mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo from 29 to 30 May
2026, including visits to Kinshasa and to Bunia, Ituri Province. Together with national authorities, including

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the Minister of Health, the mission reinforced political commitment and operational support for the
response, emphasizing strengthened coordination, community engagement, early detection, and the
delivery of quality clinical care in affected areas.
• WHO, national authorities, and partners continue to engage donors and mobilize additional resources to
address critical funding gaps and sustain response operations across affected and at-risk areas.

Operations support and logistics
• WHO has deployed 155 field personnel across the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda to support
response operations. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 58 personnel (19 international and 39
national staff) are deployed across key outbreak hotspots, while 97 personnel (three international staff and
94 national staff and consultants) have been deployed in Uganda through nine field teams to support
surveillance, case management, laboratory, logistics, and other response activities.
• Logistics corridors from Kinshasa in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nairobi in Kenya, Dakar in Senegal,
and other regional hubs remain operational, facilitating the movement of emergency supplies and
equipment to affected areas. To date, 38 metric tonnes of medical equipment, laboratory consumables,
personal protective equipment (PPE), and other emergency supplies have been transported to support
response operations across Ituri, North Kivu, and South Kivu provinces. WHO has also received an additional
five metric tonnes of emergency supplies through support from the United Nations Organization Stabilization
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO).
• Commodities valued at approximately US$ 1.88 million have been mobilized for the response. Of these,
supplies worth US$ 373 542 (20%) have been delivered, US$ 802 528 (42%) are in transit, and US$ 706 817
(38%) remain under procurement or preparation.
• Rehabilitation of the Centre Médical Évangélique (CME) Ebola Treatment Centre in Bunia has been
completed, providing capacity for 100 beds to support the isolation and clinical management of suspected
and confirmed cases.
• Cargo flights and logistics support continue to facilitate the delivery of critical response commodities despite
persistent access challenges in some affected areas. Operational assessments of warehousing, stock
positioning, and supply chain management continue to support commodity visibility and distribution across
affected provinces.
• In Uganda, logistics support for outbreak response continues to be strengthened through support to
treatment centres, isolation facilities, and points of entry (PoE). Multisectoral logistics coordination involving
WHO, UNICEF, the World Food Programme, government authorities, and operational partners remains active
to ensure the timely deployment of supplies and equipment.

Surveillance
• Surveillance operations continue to scale up across affected and at-risk countries, including for alert
reporting, case investigation, active case finding, contact tracing, retrospective reviews of cases and deaths,
and cross-border surveillance.

• To strengthen surveillance capacity in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 15 epidemiologists have been
deployed across affected health zones in Ituri, North Kivu, and South Kivu provinces to support alert
investigation, case investigation, and contact tracing activities. In addition, 100 healthcare workers have
been briefed on BVD surveillance, including case definitions and alert management, while 20 000 surveillance
forms have been distributed to affected health zones to standardize data collection, alert reporting, and

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contact listing.
• As of 29 May 2026, a total of 3200 contacts had been identified across affected provinces in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, of whom 967 (30.2%) were seen within the previous 24 hours. Contact tracing
performance remains low, particularly in Ituri Province, where insecurity, population mobility, and
operational constraints continue to hamper follow-up activities. In Uganda, 634 contacts have been
identified and remain under follow-up with a 93% follow up rate as of 29 May 2026.
• In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, community-based surveillance is being strengthened, including in
sites for internally displaced persons. The number of reported alerts continues to increase, with 149 alerts
reported on 29 May 2026, of which 84 (56.4%) were investigated and 73 (86.9%) validated.

• Cross-border surveillance and surveillance at PoEs is a major area of focus to reduce the risk of regional
spread. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 13 960 travellers passed through monitored PoE sites on
30 May 2026, of whom 13 187 (94.4%) were screened, while all travellers received BVD risk communication
messages. No contacts were identified and no alerts were generated.

• In Uganda, PoE screening continues to be strengthened to reduce the risk of cross-border transmission. As
of 30 May 2026, 31 of 37 targeted PoEs had been activated. During the previous 24 hours, 5485 travellers
were screened, generating eight initial alerts, all of which were investigated and discarded. At Entebbe
International Airport, 3814 travellers were screened, with no alerts detected. Following the announcement
on 27 May 2026 of the temporary closure of official border crossings with the Democratic Republic of the
Congo and the suspension of selected cross-border transport activities, surveillance and screening activities
in Uganda have been intensified at unofficial entry points and along high-risk population movement corridors
to mitigate the risk of undetected cross-border transmission.

Laboratory
• Diagnostic testing continues across affected countries through national and subnational laboratory
networks. As of 31 May 2026, laboratory testing in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continued at the
Bunia Provincial Laboratory and the National Institute for Biomedical Research (INRB) in Kinshasa.

• INRB has deployed additional polymerase chain reaction (PCR) equipment, supplies and personnel to Bunia.
WHO and partners continue replenishing laboratory reagents, test kits, and consumables to sustain
diagnostic operations. A total of 2016 RadiOne (KH Medical, Republic of Korea) and 14 Altona screening PCR
(Altona Diagnostics GmbH, Germany) test kits were delivered to Bunia Provincial Laboratory through WHO
support, while additional testing supplies have been pledged by Africa CDC (4800 tests) and the United States
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (more than 2000 tests). Recent laboratory stockouts have been
resolved, significantly improving diagnostic capacity and turnaround times across the three affected
provinces. The backlog of samples to be tested has been fully cleared.
• In both the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, confirmatory testing continues through national
reference laboratory networks, with partners supporting quality assurance, surge testing capacity, and
regional laboratory preparedness.

Case Management
• Treatment capacity continues to expand in affected areas. ALIMA has operationalized treatment centres in

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Bunia, Rwampara, and Goma, while rehabilitation of the Centre Médical Évangélique Ebola Treatment
Centre (ETC) in Bunia has been completed, providing capacity for up to 100 beds for the isolation and
management of suspected and confirmed cases. However, this remains insufficient to cater to the current
number of suspected and hospitalized confirmed cases.
• Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) is also supporting case management operations across affected provinces
through the construction and operationalization of ETCs, including a 65-bed ETC in Ituri, an 80-bed ETC in
Goma, and additional ETCs in Bukavu and Lwiro, alongside isolation units in multiple health facilities.
• As of 31 May, 342 persons were being managed in isolation and treatment facilities across affected
provinces in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, including 104 suspected cases and 238 confirmed cases.
• Patient absconding from treatment and isolation facilities remains a major operational challenge. During
the reporting period, 15 patients left treatment centres, including 11 from HGR Bambu, undermining
continuity of care and increasing the risk of community transmission.
• In Uganda, five confirmed cases remain under treatment at the Mulago Ebola Treatment Unit in Kampala.
• Across the two affected countries, ten patients (six in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and four in
Uganda) have recovered and been discharged from care, representing the first documented recoveries
during the current outbreak.

Infection Prevention and Control (IPC) and Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH)
Democratic Republic of the Congo

• IPC/WASH/Safe and Dignified Burial (SDB) coordination mechanisms have been established and
operationalized at national and provincial levels, with WHO and partners supporting the Ministry of Health
in validating IPC guidance documents and assessment tools.
• A total of 42 district supervisors, 50 MONUSCO personnel, and 220 frontline healthcare workers have
received IPC training and technical briefings, while 11 screening and triage points were established and IPC
kits, including PPE, were distributed to 60 high-risk health facilities.
• IPC assessments conducted in 54 health facilities identified major gaps in screening, triage, isolation
capacity, PPE availability, and health worker protection. These findings are guiding targeted IPC
strengthening activities in affected areas. A total of 102 SDB and associated decontamination activities
were conducted to reduce transmission risks in affected communities.

Uganda

• An IPC ring approach is being implemented around high-risk health facilities and affected households, with
decontamination conducted in all identified high-risk healthcare facilities and households linked to
confirmed cases.
• IPC assessments have been conducted in 88 health facilities across 10 regions to identify and address gaps
in healthcare worker protection, PPE availability, training, screening, triage, and isolation capacity. WHO-
supported IPC and healthcare worker risk assessment tools have been validated and digitalized to
strengthen real-time monitoring and targeted response interventions.
Risk Communication and Community Engagement (RCCE)
• In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, more than 6500 people have been reached with health promotion
messaging through schools, churches, community volunteers, youth groups, and community dialogues

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conducted in Bunia, Mongbwalu, Butembo, Katwa, Nyankunde, Bambu, Aru, and Rwampara health zones.

• In Uganda, RCCE activities focused on institutional and community sensitization, engagement with religious
leaders, schools, hotels, and border communities, and strengthening school-based surveillance. Fifty
bloggers and digital influencers were also oriented to amplify accurate messaging and counter
misinformation through social media platforms.

• Anthropological assessments and community perception studies continue in affected areas to better
understand perceptions, behaviours, and practices influencing outbreak transmission and response
acceptance.

Preventing and Responding to Sexual Exploitation, Abuse, and Harassment (PRSEAH)
• PRSEAH activities continue to be integrated into outbreak response operations in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and Uganda through inter-agency coordination mechanisms, joint
accountability frameworks, and partner engagement activities.
• A total of 595 response personnel, including 319 men and 276 women, have been trained and
sensitized on the prevention of and response to sexual exploitation, abuse, and harassment across
all response pillars to strengthen safeguarding and accountability during outbreak operations.
• Risk assessments have been initiated in Bunia and Rwampara to identify and mitigate safeguarding
risks associated with outbreak response activities, while reporting, referral, and accountability
mechanisms continue to be strengthened in affected areas.

Operational Readiness
• A regional preparedness and prioritization framework is being activated, with countries categorized by risk
and readiness needs. The latest assessments have shown an average readiness score of 58% among priority
one and two countries (with 90% of their readiness assessments completed and received) while 22 of 47
Member States have so far updated their readiness assessment, highlighting the need to scale up readiness
activities. Priority actions include activation of emergency operations centres, revision of contingency plans,
dissemination of case definitions, training of healthcare workers, and deployment of supplies to high-risk
areas.

• Countries have been prioritized based on epidemiological risk, cross-border exposure, and health system
readiness. The Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda remain Tier I (Highest Priority) due to active
transmission, while South Sudan, Kenya, and Tanzania are Tier II (High Priority), and Rwanda, Burundi, and
the Central African Republic are Tier III (Moderate Priority). Within the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
the Ituri–North Kivu corridor, particularly Mongbwalu–Bunia and mining-linked mobility routes, remains the
highest-priority transmission zones for intensified interventions.

• Preparedness efforts are focused on early detection and rapid response capacity, with countries
strengthening systems to ensure timely identification, investigation, isolation, and management of
suspected viral haemorrhagic fever cases.

• Uganda has conducted national risk assessment, with 26 districts categorized as very high risk and 18 districts
as high risk, guiding targeted preparedness and readiness measures.

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Border Health, Travel and Mass Gatherings
• PoE and traveller screening operations have been reinforced at high-risk crossings and internal transit routes
in both the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, with national authorities, IOM and partners
supporting PoE surveillance and implementation of WHO travel and border health guidance, as well as
measures at points of control on high priority travel corridors.

• Cross-border transmission risks remain elevated due to insecurity, humanitarian crises, high population
mobility, urban/semi-urban transmission hotspots, and porous borders, requiring intensified surveillance
and information sharing.

• Priority operational actions include rapid assessments and mapping of PoEs, informal crossings, and
congregation points, alongside ensuring field teams have adequate staffing, equipment, training, PPE,
screening materials, disinfectants, and referral systems. Mass gathering risk assessment capacity is being
built and recommendations provided.

• Postponement of mass gatherings is advised in areas of documented detection of the virus until transmission
is interrupted, while a risk-based approach applies for events in the rest of the region/outside affected areas.

• Event-specific risk assessment is recommended to be done using the WHO all-hazards mass gathering risk
assessment tool. This should be complemented by the establishment of referral pathways and RT-PCR
capacity before events, ensuring that suspected cases can be isolated pending laboratory confirmation.

• Primary symptom screening, hand hygiene and BVD risk messaging should be maintained at events,
alongside event-based surveillance, cross-border contact tracing, and post-event surveillance for at least 21
days.

Situation interpretation
The BVD outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to expand geographically, with sustained
transmission concentrated in the Ituri–North Kivu corridor and increasing risks of further spread to neighbouring
provinces and countries. Intense cross-border mobility, mining-related population movement, healthcare-associated
exposure, and persistent operational challenges linked to insecurity, displacement, and limited access to health
services continue to pose significant challenges for the response. While access to diagnostic testing kits have
improved, there are still significant turnaround times in certain health zones in North Kivu and efforts are underway
to further decentralize lab capacity. Although response capacities are improving, major gaps remain in contact
tracing, IPC readiness, community acceptance, clinical care, and patient retention, while ongoing funding constraints
and the complex humanitarian context continue to challenge response operations.

In Uganda, the occurrence of imported cases, secondary transmission among healthcare workers and contacts, and
international travels involving confirmed cases highlights the continued risk of cross-border and international spread.

WHO advises all countries, particularly high-risk neighbouring countries, to strengthen preparedness and readiness
activities, including surveillance, laboratory capacity, IPC, and rapid response measures. Sustained financial and
operational support from donors and partners remains critical to contain the outbreak and reduce the risk of further
regional and international spread.

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Contributors Editorial Advisory Group, WHO Regional
• WILLIAMS, George Sie (WHO AFRO) Office for Africa
• Hollis, Sara (WHO AFRO)
• OTSHUDIEMA, John (WHO AFRO) • Dr Marie Roseline Darnycka Belizaire,
• DIALLO, Mamadou Saliou Kalifa (WHO AFRO) Regional Emergency Director
• CONTEH, Ishata (WHO AFRO)
• MASINA, John (WHO AFRO) • Dr Etien Koua, Program Area Manager,
• MAMADU, Ibrahim (WHO AFRO) HIS/EPR/AFRO
• MASSIDI, Christian Eric (WHO AFRO)
• BORIS, Pavlin (WHO HQ) • Dr Dick Chamla, Program Area Manager,
• HAMBLION, Esther (WHO HQ) HEP/EPR/AFRO
• ALEXANDROVA EZERSKA, Lidia (WHO HQ)
• AWOFISAYO-OKUYELU, Adedoyin Abiola (WHO HQ) • Dr Otim Patrick Ramadan, Program Area
• ARTAZCOZ GLARIA, Amaia (WHO HQ) Manager, EMR/EPR/AFRO
• BRACQUEMONT, Marie (WHO HQ)
• RUBANGAKENE, Moses (WCO UGANDA) • Mr Adama Thiam, Program Area

• MGAMB, Elizabeth Adhiambo (WCO UGANDA) Manager, OSL/EPR/AFRO

• FOTSING, Richard (WCO DR CONGO)
• AJONG, Brian (WCO DR CONGO)

© WHO Regional Office for Africa
Dr Dick
This Chamla,
is not Program
an official Area Manager,
publication of the World Health Organization.
HEP/EPR/AFRO

Correspondence on this publication may be directed to:
Dr OtimEmergency
Health Patrick Ramadan, Program
Intelligence, Area and Laboratory Programme
Surveillance
Manager, EMR/EPR/AFRO
WHO Emergency Preparedness and Response
WHO Regional Office for Africa
Email: afrooutbreak@who.int

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