WHO AFRO weekly situation report 12

Data as of 2026-08-02
Published
August 2, 2026
Published by WHO, republished here as text
This is the text layer of a PDF published by the WHO Regional Office for Africa, extracted without change and laid out as the PDF lays it out. The record of authority is the PDF in IRIS.

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BUNDIBUGYO VIRUS DISEASE OUTBREAK
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Democratic Republic of the Congo | Uganda | France
Weekly External Situation Report 12, Data as of 02 August 2026

Key Figures at a Glance (Democratic Republic of the Congo)

5 Provinces 4 Provinces 727 72.4% 18 276
51 Health Zones 42 Health Zones Cases Bed Contacts
Affected Active Transmission Recovered Occupancy to follow

707 140 43 1 050 19
Active Health Worker Health Worker Bed Testing
Cases in Isolation Cases Deaths Capacity Laboratories

Summary
New New
Total Cases Total Deaths CFR (%)
Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed Probable Probable
Country (Confirmed & (Confirmed & Confirmed &
Cases (Last 7 Deaths (Last 7 Cases (total) Deaths (total) Cases Deaths
Probable) Probable) Probable
days) days)

Democratic
Republic of
the Congo
540 270 3 802 1 707 - - 3 802 1 707 44.9%

Uganda 0 0 20 2 1 1 21 3 14.3%

France 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0.0%
Note: Only confirmed and probable cases are reported.

Event description
The Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to expand rapidly,
with sustained transmission, persistently high mortality, and ongoing geographic spread. It is now the largest BVD
outbreak ever recorded and the second largest Ebola disease outbreak in history after the 2013 – 2016 West Africa
epidemic. Since its detection only a few months ago, the epidemic has grown at an exceptional rate, highlighting its
intensity and the challenges facing response efforts. Although no new international spread has been detected,
continued transmission indicates that the outbreak remains in an expansion phase and continues to pose a high risk
of regional and international spread.

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Democratic Republic of the Congo
Since the last update of 26 July 2026 (Weekly External Situation Report #11), the Democratic Republic of the Congo
has reported an additional 540 confirmed cases and 270 confirmed deaths, representing increases of 16.6% and
18.8%, respectively, in cumulative confirmed cases and deaths. Although the absolute numbers of newly reported
cases and deaths remain substantial, the proportional increases are markedly lower than those reported during the
previous reporting period, reflecting the absence of the large retrospective data reconciliation that contributed to
last week's increase. Nevertheless, the reporting of more than 500 additional confirmed cases and more than 250
confirmed deaths within a single week indicates that transmission remains intense and that the outbreak continues
to expand. The crude case fatality ratio (CFR) increased from 44.1% to 44.9%, reflecting persistently high mortality
despite ongoing response efforts. During the reporting period, the cumulative number of affected health zones
increased from 48 to 51, with Kabondo and Wanie-Rukula in Tshopo Province and Lubero in North Kivu Province
becoming the latest affected health zones, further demonstrating the continued geographic expansion of the
outbreak.
Figure 1. Weekly trend of confirmed cases of Bundibugyo virus disease in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
by epidemiological week of notification, epidemiological weeks 18 – 31, 2026

Note: The shaded grey area for the most recent epidemiological week represents incomplete data due to reporting delays.

During the last 21 days, transmission remained highly concentrated geographically, with an additional 1,867
confirmed cases and 953 confirmed deaths reported nationally. Approximately 87.9% (n=1,641) of recently reported
confirmed cases and 84.8% (n=808) of deaths occurred in Ituri Province, with the Bunia–Rwampara–Mongbwalu–
Nizi corridor continuing to represent the principal transmission focus. North Kivu, Haut-Uélé, and Tshopo together
accounted for 223 cases (11.9%) and 144 deaths (15.1%), while South Kivu reported no new confirmed cases.
However, an imported confirmed death from Tshopo Province generated new contacts requiring follow-up in South
Kivu. Of the 51 affected health zones, 42 reported at least one confirmed case during the preceding 21 days, whereas
nine health zones (Gety, Kambala, Lubunga, Mangobo, Mabalako, Makiso-Kisangani, Miti-Murhesa, Rungu, and
Vuhovi) have not reported a confirmed case for more than three weeks, suggesting that transmission may have been
interrupted in these areas, provided surveillance remains sufficiently sensitive to detect any ongoing transmission.

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The largest increases in confirmed cases over the previous 21 days were recorded in Bunia (312 cases), Nizi (285),
Rwampara (216), Mongbwalu (207), Katwa (104), Lita (84), Nia-Nia (66), Mangala (63), Fataki (31), and Butembo (29).
Together, these ten health zones accounted for approximately 84% of all additional confirmed cases reported
nationally during the period. Bunia, Nizi, Mongbwalu, and Rwampara remained the principal transmission corridor,
accounting for nearly 55% of all newly reported confirmed cases. Continued increases in Lita, Nia-Nia, Mangala, and
Fataki indicate sustained transmission within the Ituri epicentre, while ongoing transmission in Katwa and Butembo
confirms persistent transmission in North Kivu. Continued increases in Isiro and Wamba further indicate that the
outbreak is becoming increasingly established in Haut-Uélé Province.
Mortality remained concentrated within the same transmission corridor driving the epidemic. More than half (55.4%)
of all confirmed deaths continue to occur outside designated treatment facilities, indicating that many patients are
still being detected only late in illness or after death. Delayed case detection and delayed access to specialised
treatment therefore remain major contributors to mortality. Recent analyses indicate a median interval of eight days
from symptom onset to death, with almost half of deaths occurring within the first week of illness, emphasizing the
narrow window available for life-saving clinical intervention.
Figure 2. Reported Bundibugyo virus disease deaths in the Democratic Republic of the Congo by place of
occurrence, 24 June – 02 August 2026

Children younger than five years continue to experience disproportionately high mortality. Although they account
for fewer than one in ten confirmed cases nationally, they represent approximately 17% of all confirmed deaths,
experience the highest case fatality ratios of any age group, and have the shortest interval between symptom onset
and death. Conversely, adults aged 20 – 59 years continue to account for most transmission, representing nearly
two-thirds of confirmed cases. These findings suggest that outbreak control should continue to prioritise interrupting
transmission among working-age adults while simultaneously strengthening rapid identification and referral of
young children to reduce mortality.

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Figure 3. Bundibugyo virus disease case fatality ratio by age group and sex, Democratic Republic of the Congo,
data as of 02 August 2026 (n=1,052 deaths)

Figure 4. Weekly proportion of Bundibugyo virus disease deaths by age group, Democratic Republic of the Congo,
data as of 02 August 2026 (n=1,052 deaths)

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Surveillance performance remains suboptimal. As of 2 August 2026, 18,276 contacts were under follow-up nationally,
of whom 14,466 (79.2%) were successfully seen during the previous 24 hours, remaining well below the operational
target of 95%. Contact tracing capacity continues to lag behind the growing number of contacts to follow, particularly
in Ituri and North Kivu, while persistently low follow-up rates and intermittent reporting in Haut-Uélé and Tshopo
limit interpretation of recent trends.

Figure 5. Trend in Contacts Under Follow-up and Daily Contact Follow-up Performance, Democratic Republic of
the Congo, 22 June - 02 August 2026

Since the beginning of the outbreak, the Democratic Republic of the Congo has reported 3,802 confirmed cases,
including 1,707 confirmed deaths, corresponding to a crude CFR of 44.9%. The outbreak now affects 51 health zones
across five provinces. Ituri Province remains the epicentre, accounting for 3,317 confirmed cases (87.2%) and 1,382
confirmed deaths (81.0%) nationwide. The most affected health zones remain Bunia (914 cases, 270 deaths),
Rwampara (655 cases, 263 deaths), Mongbwalu (552 cases, 263 deaths), Nizi (402 cases, 194 deaths), Lita (141 cases,
84 deaths), and Nyankunde (115 cases, 34 deaths) in Ituri Province, together with Katwa (186 cases, 122 deaths) and
Butembo (87 cases, 69 deaths) in North Kivu Province. Collectively, these health zones account for the overwhelming
majority of confirmed cases and deaths reported nationwide.

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Figure 6. Geographical distribution of cumulative confirmed cases of Bundibugyo virus disease in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and Uganda, data as of 02 August 2026

Uganda and France
No new cases have been reported in Uganda or France since the previous update. In Uganda, the last confirmed
patient was discharged on 16 July 2026, and 17 days have passed without a new confirmed case. All identified
contacts have completed the required 21-day follow-up, and no contacts remain under active monitoring. In France,
the imported confirmed BVD case reported on 24 June 2026 recovered and was discharged on 4 July 2026 after two
consecutive negative PCR test results. No secondary transmission was identified, and all five flight contacts
completed their 21-day follow-up without developing symptoms. As of 2 August 2026, 29 days have passed since the
patient's discharge without any additional confirmed BVD cases being reported from France. Despite the absence of
new cases, Uganda remains at high risk of reintroduction because of the ongoing outbreak in the neighbouring
Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Risk Assessment

The overall public health risk in the Democratic Republic of the Congo remains very high. The outbreak continues to
expand, with sustained transmission, persistently high mortality, and continued spread to newly affected health
zones. Transmission remains concentrated within the Bunia–Rwampara–Mongbwalu–Nizi corridor, while ongoing
spread in Haut-Uélé and Tshopo indicates progressive geographic expansion beyond the original epicentre.

The risk of further national and international spread remains high because transmission continues along major

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internal and cross-border mobility corridors linking the outbreak to Uganda, South Sudan, and other neighbouring
countries. Although Uganda and France have reported no additional cases since their previous imported events,
sustained transmission in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to pose a significant risk of cross-
border spread. Continued cross-border surveillance, rapid information sharing, and preparedness remain essential
to ensure early detection and rapid containment of any imported cases.

Figure 7. Bundibugyo virus disease transmission risk along major mobility corridor in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, data as of 02 August 2026

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Table 1. Confirmed cases and deaths of Bundibugyo virus disease in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
and Uganda by geographic area, as of 02 August 2026

Province/ Health zone/ Cum. Cum. Cases (last Deaths (last Date last Days since
Country CFR %
Region district cases deaths 21 d) 21 d) case last case
Boma Mangbetu 13 4 30.8 11 3 2026-07-29 4
Democratic Isiro 19 11 57.9 18 10 2026-08-02 0
Republic Haut-Uélé Pawa 12 10 83.3 9 7 2026-08-01 1
of the Congo Rungu 1 0 0.0 1 0 2026-07-24 9
Wamba 16 9 56.2 8 1 2026-08-01 1
Subtotal—Haut-Uélé
61 34 55.7 47 21

Adja 11 1 9.1 11 1 2026-07-26 7
Ariwara 7 2 28.6 6 1 2026-07-20 13
Aru 5 5 100.0 2 4 2026-07-22 11
Aungba 10 5 50.0 4 3 2026-08-02 0
Bambu 64 15 23.4 33 5 2026-08-02 0
Boga 1 1 100.0 0 0 2026-07-11 22
Bunia 914 270 29.5 380 98 2026-08-02 0
Damas 18 8 44.4 13 8 2026-08-01 1
Drodro 11 6 54.5 6 3 2026-08-01 1
Fataki 35 17 48.6 30 13 2026-07-31 2
Gety 1 0 0.0 0 0 2026-05-21 73
Kambala 2 0 0.0 0 0 2026-05-30 64
Kilo 29 11 37.9 20 10 2026-07-27 6
Democratic Komanda 37 27 73.0 10 17 2026-08-01 1
Republic Ituri
of the Congo Lita 141 84 59.6 82 61 2026-08-02 0
Logo 9 4 44.4 2 4 2026-07-24 9
Lolwa 7 2 28.6 5 1 2026-07-29 4
Mahagi 4 1 25.0 4 1 2026-07-27 6
Mambasa 10 6 60.0 5 2 2026-08-01 1
Mandima 16 12 75.0 8 9 2026-07-27 6
Mangala 105 66 62.9 55 37 2026-08-01 1
Mongbwalu 552 263 47.6 216 81 2026-08-02 0
Nia-Nia 104 57 54.8 68 50 2026-08-02 0
Nizi 402 194 48.3 271 144 2026-08-02 0
Nyankunde 115 34 29.6 16 8 2026-07-31 2
Rimba 9 4 44.4 5 4 2026-07-24 9
Rwampara 655 263 40.2 250 168 2026-08-02 0
Tchomia 43 24 55.8 24 20 2026-08-02 0
Subtotal—Ituri
3,317 1,382 41.7 1,526 751

Beni 64 49 76.6 33 29 2026-08-02 0
Butembo 87 69 79.3 41 47 2026-08-01 1
Goma 1 0 0.0 0 0 2026-05-25 69
Kalunguta 7 4 57.1 5 3 2026-08-02 0
Katwa 186 122 65.6 110 67 2026-08-02 0
Democratic Kyondo 13 10 76.9 6 7 2026-07-24 9
Republic North Kivu
of the Congo Lubero 1 1 100.0 1 1 2026-08-02 0
Mabalako 1 0 0.0 0 0 2026-06-13 50
Masereka 5 1 20.0 2 1 2026-07-22 11
Musienene 43 25 58.1 32 23 2026-08-02 0
Oicha 4 3 75.0 1 1 2026-07-19 14
Vuhovi 2 1 50.0 1 0 2026-08-02 0

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Province/ Health zone/ Cum. Cum. Cases (last Deaths (last Date last Days since
Country CFR %
Region district cases deaths 21 d) 21 d) case last case
Subtotal—North Kivu
414 285 68.8 232 179

Democratic
Republic South Kivu Miti-Murhesa 3 1 33.3 0 0 2026-05-20 74
of the Congo
Subtotal—South Kivu
3 1 33.3 0 0

Kabondo 1 1 100.0 1 1 2026-07-27 6
Democratic Lubunga 1 0 0.0 0 0 2026-07-11 22
Republic Tshopo Makiso-Kisangani 3 3 100.0 0 0 2026-07-11 22
of the Congo Mangobo 1 1 100.0 0 0 2026-07-11 22
Wanie-Rukula 1 0 0.0 1 0 2026-07-29 4
Subtotal—Tshopo
7 5 71.4 2 1

Uganda Kampala Kampala 21 3 14.3 0 0 2026-06-21 42
Subtotal—Uganda
21 3 14.3 0 0

Cells shaded green indicate health zones with no newly reported confirmed case for 21 or more days. Values are reproduced as published in the source situation
report.

Public health response
Coordination
• WHO continues to coordinate the international response to the BVD outbreak under the Public Health
Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) framework, working closely with the Ministries of Health of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, neighbouring countries, and technical partners.

• WHO, the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC), and partners continue to
implement the Joint Continental Preparedness and Response Plan. Since its launch in June, the plan has
remained the primary continental coordination mechanism for supporting preparedness and response
across affected and at-risk African countries.

• National coordination in the Democratic Republic of the Congo remains fully activated through the Public
Health Emergency Operations Centre (PHEOC), with multisectoral response activities continuing across all
five affected provinces.

• Cross-border coordination with neighbouring countries remains a priority because of sustained
transmission along major population movement corridors linking the eastern Democratic Republic of the
Congo with Uganda and South Sudan.

• The National Incident Management Systems in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda
continued to receive operational support from WHO; Africa CDC; the United Nations Children's Fund
(UNICEF); the International Organization for Migration (IOM); Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF); the Alliance
for International Medical Action (ALIMA); International Medical Corps (IMC); Samaritan's Purse; the

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European Union (EU); the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN); Emergency Medical
Teams (EMTs); the Health Cluster; the Standby Partnership (SBP); and other partners through technical
assistance, expert deployments, surge capacity, laboratory strengthening, logistics, and field operations.

Operations Support and Logistics (OSL)
• Procurement and deployment of critical response supplies continued during the reporting period. The total
emergency supply pipeline increased from approximately US$10.62 million to US$11.29 million. Of this
amount, the value of delivered supplies increased from US$3.59 million (34%) to US$4.14 million (37%), while
the value of supplies in transit decreased from US$2.86 million (27%) to US$2.52 million (22%). The value of
commodities not yet ready for shipment increased to US$4.64 million (41%), reflecting continued
procurement to support the expanding response.

• Delivery of emergency supplies continued to increase during the reporting period. The cumulative value of
delivered commodities rose by approximately US$550,000, while delivered cargo increased from 265.5
metric tons to 312.5 metric tons and from 1,583.2 cubic metres to 1,827.2 cubic metres, further
strengthening operational support for response activities in the Ituri and Kivu hubs.

• Essential response commodities continued to reach affected areas, including 66,974 hooded coveralls, more
than 5.53 million examination gloves, 158,800 Level 3 gowns, 261 hospital beds, 20,016 PCR tests, 10,076
infrared thermometers, patient liners, medicines, and laboratory equipment. Personal protective equipment
(PPE) and infection prevention and control (IPC) supplies remained the largest procurement category
(US$5.99 million), followed by medical equipment (US$1.82 million), laboratory supplies (US$1.18 million),
logistics equipment (US$1.00 million), and medicines (US$0.89 million).

• Supply chain operations continued to support case management, laboratory diagnostics, surveillance,
infection prevention and control, and field operations. Although the proportion of supplies in transit declined
to 22%, 41% of the procurement pipeline (US$4.64 million) remained not yet ready for shipment, highlighting
the need for continued monitoring to ensure the timely availability of critical response supplies as the
outbreak continues to expand.

• Procurement and shipment coordination continued through WHO's international supply network and
logistics hubs in Kinshasa (Democratic Republic of the Congo), Nairobi (Kenya), Dubai (United Arab Emirates),
and Dakar (Senegal). Most procurement (81%; US$8.85 million) continued to originate directly from
international suppliers, while regional logistics hubs supported consolidation, onward transportation,
shipment tracking, and distribution to affected areas..

Surveillance
• Surveillance activities continued across affected and at-risk areas, including active case finding, alert
management, case investigation, contact tracing, mortality surveillance, community-based surveillance, and
cross-border surveillance.

• A high volume of alerts continued to be reported. On 2 August 2026, 1,265 alerts were reported in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, of which 1,164 (92.0%) were investigated within 24 hours. Most alerts
originated from North Kivu (731) and Ituri (531), while three alerts were reported from South Kivu.
Investigation performance was highest in South Kivu (100%), followed by North Kivu (99.6%) and Ituri

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(81.5%). Reporting from Haut-Uélé and Tshopo was unavailable, limiting the assessment of surveillance
performance in these provinces. A total of 275 suspected cases, including 123 community deaths, were
validated.

• Surveillance at points of entry (PoE) and points of control (PoC) continued to be strengthened. As of 2 August
2026, 72.7% of planned PoE/PoC sites were operational nationally, including 100% of planned sites in Ituri
(60/60), North Kivu (18/18), and South Kivu (9/9), compared with 30.3% in Haut-Uélé and 21.1% in Tshopo.
During the reporting period, 253,043 travellers passed through operational PoE/PoC sites, of whom 98.0%
were screened for BVD symptoms. Four alerts were generated through PoE/PoC surveillance, two of which
were validated as live alerts. One community death was intercepted and sampled. No confirmed cases were
identified through PoE/PoC screening during the reporting period.

• Contact tracing continued but remained below the operational target. As of 2 August 2026, 18,276 contacts
were under follow-up, of whom 14,466 (79.2%) were successfully seen during the previous 24 hours,
remaining well below the operational target of 95%. Follow-up performance was highest in South Kivu
(100%), followed by Ituri (82.1%), North Kivu (74.7%), and Haut-Uélé (66.7%). No contact tracing data were
reported from Tshopo during the reporting period, limiting the assessment of contact tracing performance
in that province.

Laboratory
• Laboratory decentralization continued to expand with the goal to reduce turnaround times. As of 29 July
2026, 19 diagnostic laboratories and testing units were operational across Ituri, South Kivu, Tshopo, Haut-
Uélé and North Kivu provinces, in addition to the Institut National de Recherche Biomédicale (INRB) in
Kinshasa and INRB-Goma laboratories.

• Laboratory testing capacity has been further strengthened through the deployment of 54 laboratory experts
(approximately five per facility), as well as the distribution of 2496 polymerase chain reaction (PCR) test kits
and 14,000 RadiOne tests.

• Laboratory testing throughput remained high, particularly in Ituri, where positivity rates ranged from 37.9%
to 63.3%, indicating sustained intense transmission, while North Kivu maintained lower positivity rates
between 3% and 4.2%, alongside the clearance of residual testing backlog.

• Despite ongoing scale-up efforts, laboratory operations continued to face challenges related to delayed
result reporting, weak data integration and information management systems, limited logistics capacity, and
shortages of complementary diagnostic tests for clinical care.

Case Management
• Case management capacity expansion continued to expand across the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
with bed capacity increasing to 1050 across 33 treatment facilities.

• As of 2 August 2026, 707 patients were in isolation, corresponding to an overall bed occupancy rate of 67.3%.
However, bed occupancy is not uniformed and remained particularly high in North Kivu (131.9%).

• Clinical outcomes continued to improve, with cumulative recoveries increasing to 727 by 2 August 2026,
reflecting the continued provision of supportive clinical care despite increasing case numbers.

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• Capacity building on management of critically ill patients has been initiated with 3 cycles of training
conducted. Over 40 healthcare workers have been trained on the use of High Flow Oxygen, with an additional
20 undergoing training for subsequent deployment in various treatment centres across affected provinces.

Operational Research
• Clinical research and access to investigational therapeutics continued through the WHO-supported
PARTNERS clinical trial, which began on 2 July 2026 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and is evaluating
MBP134 and remdesivir for the treatment of BVD. This is complemented by the partner-supported EBO-PEP
trial, which commenced on 14 July 2026 and is assessing obeldesivir as post-exposure prophylaxis for high-
risk contacts.

• Additionally, Phase I evaluation of vaccine candidates for Bundibugyo virus are underway in the United
Kingdom and Canada with additional studies expected to begin in Africa. WHO continues to support research
preparedness through the development of standardized epidemiologic protocols, a regional research
tracking system, and community engagement materials to improve understanding of clinical research.

Infection Prevention and Control (IPC) and Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH)
• In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as of 26 July 2026, 947 health care facilities (HCFs) had been
assessed for IPC readiness across the four affected provinces (Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, and Tshopo),
covering 51 health zones. The average overall IPC score was 38.0% (median: 37.1%), indicating that IPC
capacity across the response area remained critically low compared with the 80% threshold considered
satisfactory for Ebola preparedness.

• Of the 947 HCFs assessed, 705 (74%) were classified as "Insufficient", 221 (23%) as "Partial", and only 21 (2%)
met the "Satisfactory" threshold (≥80%). Additionally, 248 facilities (26%) had reported at least one
suspected or confirmed case, underscoring the urgency of addressing these IPC gaps.

• Across the 17 standardized IPC components assessed, the weakest areas were personal protective
equipment (PPE) (11%), training (13%), isolation area set-up (17%), post-exposure management (23%), and
cleaning and disinfection (25%), all of which were rated "Insufficient." Even the strongest-performing
components – injection safety (75%), patient placement (72%), waste treatment (65%), sterilization (58%),
and water supply (52%) – remained within the "Partial" category, indicating that no IPC component had yet
reached the standard required for adequate Ebola response readiness at the national level.

• Healthcare worker infections continued to increase, with 123 infections and 37 deaths reported among
healthcare workers, corresponding to a CFR of 29.8%. This underscores persistent occupational exposure
risks and inadequate implementation of IPC measures in health facilities. Gaps also remain in the availability
of appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE) for different categories of healthcare workers.

• In response to these findings, WHO and partners continued to scale up IPC/WASH interventions across
affected areas. More than 1,000 frontline health workers, supervisors, hygienists, and members of safe and
dignified burial (SDB) teams received IPC training. In addition, more than 450 IPC rings were activated,
resulting in the decontamination of over 1,000 households and health facilities, the distribution of more than
130 IPC kits to health facilities, and over 450 assessments of exposed health workers. Furthermore, more
than 115 screening and triage points were established, with over 500 supportive supervision and mentorship

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visits conducted. IPC/WASH assessments were also completed at all eight Ebola treatment centres (ETCs).

• Safe and dignified burial (SDB) operations and decontamination activities continued across affected health
zones, including the decontamination of households, health facilities, and transport vehicles linked to
confirmed cases.

Risk Communication and Community Engagement (RCCE)
• RCCE activities continued across affected provinces to strengthen community awareness, promote early alert
reporting, support contact tracing, and SDB operations, particularly in hotspot areas of Ituri and North Kivu.
Additional RCCE personnel and anthropological expertise were deployed to newly affected provinces to
strengthen community engagement.

• Community feedback and rapid community assessments continued to inform the response by identifying
concerns related to transmission risks, access to services, vaccination, and response activities. Findings are
being translated into community-led interventions and expanded across affected areas of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, with plans to extend implementation to Uganda and South Sudan.

• Capacity-building efforts continued through the development of an RCCE Humanizing the Response training
package and the training of trainers for response partners. A targeted RCCE strategy was also developed for
IDP camps, incorporating findings from rapid community assessments to strengthen community
engagement.

• Key RCCE challenges persisted, including delay in intervention services (like SDB), insecurity in hotspot areas,
limited community trust and acceptance in mining and conflict-affected communities, misinformation, and
highly mobility of populations. Community engagement efforts therefore remained focused on building trust
in response services and improving access among high-risk populations.

Preventing and Responding to Sexual Exploitation, Abuse, and Harassment (PRSEAH)
• National and provincial coordination mechanisms continued to strengthen strategic oversight, operational
alignment, information sharing, and accountability across all levels of the response.

• PRSEAH activities were expanded through induction briefings, community awareness sessions, and training
for response workers, healthcare personnel, community leaders, and transport workers across the affected
provinces.

• Institutional capacity for PRSEAH was further strengthened through the launch of a Health Cluster capacity
assessment in Ituri and specialized training, enhancing systems for reporting, referral, and the management
of complaints related to sexual exploitation and abuse.

Public health preparedness
Operational Readiness
• Regional preparedness continued to improve during the reporting period. Since the previous update, one
additional Member State completed and submitted its readiness assessment, increasing coverage from 30

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to 31 of the 47 Member States (64% to 66%), while the overall assessment completion rate remained high
at 90%. The average readiness score among Priority 1 and 2 countries remained 58%.

• Repeat readiness assessments expanded from three to six high-priority countries. In addition to Angola,
South Sudan, and Tanzania, Kenya, Rwanda, and Zambia completed repeat assessments, demonstrating
continued improvements in national preparedness capacities.

• Regional deployments to strengthen preparedness continued in high-risk Member States. During the
reporting period, South Sudan was added to the list of countries receiving ongoing regional support,
alongside Burundi, the Central African Republic, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Border Health, Travel and Mass Gatherings
• Screening and public health measures have been reinforced at airports, high-risk border crossings, and
internal transit routes in both the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda. National authorities, the
International Organization for Migration (IOM), and partners continue to support the implementation of
WHO border health guidance, strengthen cross-border coordination, and facilitate the timely detection,
reporting and referral of suspected cases at PoEs and PoCs along priority travel corridors.

• Cross-border preparedness and response are being strengthened through enhanced coordination among the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, and South Sudan to improve the early detection of cases and
reduce the risk of cross-border spread. Priority actions include strengthening coordinated cross-border
disease surveillance, event-based surveillance, active case finding, joint investigations and contact tracing
where required, and real-time information sharing through regular cross-border coordination meetings and
harmonized reporting mechanisms.

• Priority operational actions include rapid assessments and mapping of PoEs, strengthening surveillance along
high-risk cross-border mobility corridors, including informal crossings, and major congregation points, and
ensuring readiness capacities through the provision of trained personnel, equipment, PPE, referral
mechanisms, disinfectants, risk communication materials and contingency plans for the safe management of
suspected cases

• Mass gathering risk assessment capacity is being strengthened through training and technical support. The
postponement of mass gatherings is advised in areas with documented BVD transmission until transmission
is interrupted, while a risk-based approach is recommended for events held elsewhere in the region.

• Event-specific risk assessments should be conducted using the WHO all-hazards mass gathering risk
assessment tool. These assessments should be complemented by implementation of measures before,
during, and after events, as outlined in WHO guidance for mass gatherings attended by individuals from
areas with documented Bundibugyo virus detection, including the establishment of referral pathways and
RT-PCR testing capacity.

• Event organisers should distribute participant information to all attendees before and during the event,
covering BVD symptoms, what to do if feeling unwell, and available health services, in line with WHO
guidance for mass gathering events attended by individuals from areas with documented BDBV detection.

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Situation interpretation
The BVD outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo remains in an expansion phase despite an increasingly
robust response. Persistently high mortality, frequent community deaths, delayed case detection, and suboptimal
contact tracing continue to sustain transmission, while weak infection prevention and control in health facilities
contributes to ongoing healthcare-associated transmission. Although response capacity has expanded substantially,
including laboratory services, case management, logistics, and regional preparedness, further progress will depend
on rapidly improving early case detection, achieving high-quality contact tracing, strengthening infection prevention
and control, reducing community deaths through earlier access to treatment, and maintaining coordinated cross-
border preparedness to prevent regional and international spread.

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[PAGE 16]

Contributors Editorial Advisory Group, WHO Regional
Office for Africa
• WILLIAMS, George Sie (WHO AFRO)
• OTSHUDIEMA, John (WHO AFRO) • Dr Marie Roseline Darnycka Belizaire —
• CONTEH, Ishata (WHO AFRO) Regional Emergency Director, EPR/AFRO
• MASINA, John (WHO AFRO)
• MAMADU, Ibrahim (WHO AFRO) • Dr Otim Patrick Ramadan — Programme
• ROQUILLE, Denise (WHO AFRO) Area Manager, EMR/EPR/AFRO &
• MUTEBA, Michel (WHO AFRO)
Deputy Regional Incident Manager, BVD
Response
• BORIS, Pavlin (WHO HQ)
• HAMBLION, Esther (WHO HQ)
• KASSAMALI, Zyleen (WHO HQ) • Dr Etien Koua — Programme Area
Manager, HIS/EPR/AFRO
• DIAZ, Janet Victoria (WHO HQ)
• ALLAIN IOOS, Sophie (WHO HQ)
• HAMOUDA, Mahmoud Aly Zeenelabdin (WHO HQ) • Dr Dick Chamla — Programme Area
• MOLINARO, Paul (WHO HQ)
Manager, HEP/EPR/AFRO
• LEGAND, Anaïs (WHO HQ)
• WAUQUIER, Nadia (WHO HQ) • Mr Adama Thiam — Programme Area
• SODAGAR, Vaishali (WHO HQ) Manager, OSL/EPR/AFRO
• WANG, Ninglan (WHO HQ)
• SELENIC MINET, Dubravka (WHO HQ)
• ALEXANDROVA EZERSKA, Lidia (WHO HQ)
• MORAN, Thomas (WHO HQ)
• RUBANGAKENE, Moses (WCO Uganda)
• MGAMB, Elizabeth Adhiambo (WCO Uganda)
• FOTSING, Richard (WCO DR Congo)
• AJONG, Brian (WCO DR Congo)

© WHO Regional Office for Africa
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WHO Emergency Preparedness and Response
WHO Regional Office for Africa
Email: afrooutbreak@who.int
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