WHO AFRO weekly situation report 13

Data as of 2026-08-09
Published
August 9, 2026
Published by WHO, republished here as text
This is the text layer of a PDF published by the WHO Regional Office for Africa, extracted without change and laid out as the PDF lays it out. The record of authority is the PDF in IRIS.

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BUNDIBUGYO VIRUS DISEASE OUTBREAK
dr
Democratic Republic of the Congo | Uganda | France
Weekly External Situation Report 13, Data as of 09 August 2026

Key Figures at a Glance (Democratic Republic of the Congo)

5 Provinces 4 Provinces 869 67.0% 16 183
53 Health Zones 44 Health Zones Cases Bed Contacts
Affected Active Transmission* Recovered Occupancy to follow

704 155 45 1 050 19
Active Health Worker Health Worker Bed Testing
Cases in Isolation Cases Deaths Capacity Laboratories

Note: Health zones with active transmission have reported at least one case in the last 21 days.

Summary
New New
Total Cases Total Deaths CFR (%)
Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed Probable Probable
Country (Confirmed & (Confirmed & Confirmed &
Cases (Last 7 Deaths (Last 7 Cases (total) Deaths (total) Cases Deaths
Probable) Probable) Probable
days) days)

Democratic
Republic of
the Congo
579 304 4 381 2 011 - - 4 381 2 011 45.9%

Uganda 0 0 20 2 1 1 21 3 14.3%

France 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0.0%
Note: Only confirmed and probable cases are reported.

Event description
Democratic Republic of the Congo
The Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo remains in a phase of intense
and expanding transmission, with cumulative deaths crossing the grim milestone of 2,000 only 86 days after the
outbreak was officially declared on 15 May 2026. Since External Situation Report #12, an additional 579 confirmed
cases and 304 confirmed deaths have been reported, bringing the cumulative total to 4,381 confirmed cases and 2,011
confirmed deaths as of 9 August 2026, corresponding to a case fatality ratio of 45.9%. Ituri remains the epicentre,
accounting for 85.8% of cumulative cases and 80.6% of cumulative deaths.

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Figure 1. Daily log-linear growth trend of confirmed cases of Bundibugyo virus disease in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo by date of report, data as 09 August 2026

The epidemic is increasingly characterized by sustained transmission within interconnected geographic clusters
alongside continued geographic expansion. The Bunia–Rwampara–Mongbwalu–Nizi corridor remains the principal
transmission focus, while persistent transmission in North Kivu and increasing activity in Haut-Uélé indicate spread
beyond the original Ituri epicentre. The number of affected health zones increased from 51 in External Situation Report
#12 to 53 as of 9 August 2026, with Gombari in Haut-Uélé and Bafwasende in Tshopo being the most recently affected
health zones. Overall, the outbreak now affects 53 of 140 health zones across five provinces.

Figure 2. Map showing geographic expansion of the Bundibugyo virus disease outbreak in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, data as of 09 August 2026

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Figure 3. Geographical distribution of cumulative confirmed cases of Bundibugyo virus disease in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and Uganda, data as of 09 August 2026

Persistently high mortality continues to highlight gaps in early detection and timely access to care. Community deaths
remain frequent, with 34 of 51 reported deaths (66.7%) occurring outside treatment centres on 9 August 2026.
Surveillance performance improved, with all 242 validated suspected cases being investigated on 9 August 2026. Contact
follow-up also increased to 86.7%, exceeding 85% for the first time, although performance remained substantially lower
in Haut-Uélé at 57.9%, partly due to incomplete reporting. Despite these improvements, gaps in alert reporting, contact
identification and follow-up around confirmed cases persist. Treatment capacity also remains under pressure, with
several treatment and transit centres in Ituri saturated, while North Kivu continues to face constraints in referral
capacity and Haut-Uélé still lacks a standard Ebola treatment centre in its six affected health zones.

Intense transmission is also occurring against a backdrop of increasing operational and workforce pressures. Challenges
related to the timely remuneration of response personnel have been reported in some affected areas, with potential
implications for workforce motivation and the continuity of response activities, including community-based
interventions and operations at points of entry and points of control. Community resistance, insecurity and operational
incidents continued to pose challenges to the timely implementation of response activities, including safe and dignified
burials. These pressures are particularly concerning as epidemiological analyses indicate that transmission is occurring
faster than cases are being detected and isolated, while contact-tracing capacity is increasingly stretched.

Despite the absence of further international transmission, the continued high incidence in eastern Democratic Republic

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of the Congo poses a substantial risk of cross-border spread, particularly to Uganda and South Sudan through major
population movement corridors. Surveillance at points of entry (PoEs) and points of control (PoCs) continued along key
mobility corridors, although operational constraints persist at some sites. Continued strengthening of cross-border
surveillance, information sharing and coordination with neighbouring countries remains essential for the early detection
and management of potential cross-border transmission.

Uganda and France
No new BVD cases have been reported in Uganda. The last confirmed patient was discharged on 16 July 2026, and all
identified contacts subsequently completed follow-up. As of 9 August 2026, 24 days had elapsed since the last patient's
discharge without a new confirmed case. However, continued high transmission in neighbouring eastern Democratic
Republic of the Congo poses a risk of reintroduction.

France has reported no secondary transmission following the imported case detected on 24 June 2026. The patient
recovered and was discharged on 4 July 2026 after two consecutive negative polymerase chain (PCR) test results, and
all five identified flight contacts completed 21 days of follow-up without developing symptoms. As of 9 August 2026, 36
days had elapsed since the patient's discharge without an additional confirmed case being reported in France.

Public health response
Coordination
• The WHO–Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC) Continental Incident Management
Support Team (IMST), based in Kampala, Uganda, continued to coordinate implementation of the Joint
Continental Preparedness and Response Plan, supporting strategic and operational alignment across affected
and at-risk countries. The mechanism continued to facilitate joint planning, information sharing, partner
coordination, and mobilization of technical and operational support, with particular attention to cross-border
preparedness and response.

• High-level WHO and Africa CDC leadership missions to Uganda on 3 August 2026 and the Democratic Republic
of the Congo from 4 August 2026 reinforced political and strategic oversight of the response. In Uganda, WHO
Regional Director for Africa Professor Mohamed Janabi and Africa CDC leadership engaged national authorities
on maintaining preparedness against re-importation, strengthening cross-border surveillance, and enhancing
regional coordination. The mission subsequently continued to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where
senior WHO and Africa CDC leadership reviewed the rapidly evolving outbreak and response operations and
called for further adaptation and scale-up of the response.

• In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, national and provincial coordination mechanisms remained fully
activated, with increased emphasis on decentralizing and adapting operations to persistent community
transmission. Coordination focused on strengthening community-centred active case finding, contact tracing,
and timely access to care; cross-validating surveillance, laboratory, and planning data; and strengthening
coordination at points of entry and points of control along high-risk population movement corridors.

• WHO continued to coordinate with Africa CDC and a broad network of operational partners to address priority
response gaps and strengthen national capacities. The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), International
Organization for Migration (IOM), Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), Alliance for International Medical Action
(ALIMA), International Medical Corps (IMC), Samaritan’s Purse, European Union (EU), Global Outbreak Alert and

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Response Network (GOARN), Emergency Medical Teams (EMTs), Health Cluster, and other partners continued
to provide technical assistance, expert deployments, surge capacity, laboratory support, logistics, and field
operations in affected and at-risk areas.

Operations Support and Logistics (OSL)
• The total emergency supply pipeline increased slightly from US$11.29 million to US$11.35 million. The value of
supplies delivered increased from US$4.14 million (37%) to US$4.26 million (38%), while supplies in transit
increased from US$2.52 million (22%) to US$2.64 million (23%). Commodities not yet ready for shipment
decreased from US$4.64 million (41%) to US$4.45 million (39%), indicating a modest improvement in pipeline
readiness.

• An additional approximately US$120,000 worth of supplies was delivered during the reporting period.
Cumulative delivered cargo increased from 312.5 to 316.7 metric tonnes, while the latest reported delivered
volume stands at 1,787.4 cubic metres.

• Delivery of critical commodities to the Ituri and Kivu hubs continued. Cumulative deliveries include 66,974
hooded coveralls, more than 5.53 million examination gloves, 158,800 Level 3 gowns, 261 hospital beds, 10,076
infrared thermometers and more than 23,800 PCR tests. In addition, 29,100 hooded coveralls and 2.19 million
examination gloves are currently in transit.

• Personal protective equipment and infection prevention and control supplies remained the largest procurement
category, increasing slightly from US$5.99 million to US$6.03 million. This was followed by medical equipment
(US$1.81 million), laboratory supplies (US$1.18 million), logistics supplies (US$1.02 million) and medicines
(US$0.89 million).

• The overall supply pipeline showed modest improvement during the reporting period, with the proportion of
commodities not yet ready for shipment declining from 41% to 39%. Nevertheless, US$7.09 million (62%) of the
total pipeline remains either in transit or not yet ready for shipment, underscoring the need to accelerate
procurement and delivery of critical supplies as response operations continue. International suppliers account
for 81% (US$9.30 million) of the total procurement value, with WHO logistics hubs supporting consolidation and
onward delivery to affected areas.

Surveillance
• Surveillance activities continued across affected and at-risk areas, including active case finding, alert
management and investigation, contact tracing, mortality surveillance, community-based surveillance, and
surveillance at PoEs and PoCs.

• Reporting of alerts remained high. On 9 August 2026, 1,426 alerts were recorded and verified across the five
affected provinces, of which 242 (16.9%) were validated as suspected cases. All 242 suspected cases (100%)
were investigated, and 124 were transferred to Ebola treatment or transit centres for isolation and further
assessment.

• Surveillance at PoEs and PoCs continued along major population movement corridors. On 9 August 2026,
106,546 travellers were screened, representing 98% screening coverage, and 20 alerts were detected through
PoE/PoC surveillance. Detected alerts were referred for further investigation and appropriate management.

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• Contact tracing improved but remained below the operational target of 95%. As of 9 August 2026, 16,183
contacts were under follow-up, of whom 14,029 (86.7%) were successfully seen. Follow-up performance
remained substantially lower in Haut-Uélé at 57.9%, partly due to incomplete reporting.

Laboratory
• Diagnostic capacity continued to expand through decentralized testing. The network includes 19 operational
laboratories and testing units, with additional laboratories being established in Rwampara, Fataki, Bambu-Mine,
Boga and Mambasa health zones in Ituri. In Haut-Uélé, a diagnostic platform has been installed in Isiro and seven
RadiOne platforms have been acquired.

• Laboratory testing remained high, with sustained positivity indicating continued active transmission. Positive
samples continued to be detected predominantly in Ituri, with additional positive results in North Kivu and Haut-
Uélé, consistent with ongoing transmission across multiple affected provinces.

• Reverse-transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) and rapid molecular platforms remain the main
diagnostic methods. WHO has listed the first molecular diagnostic specifically for Bundibugyo virus under its
Emergency Use Listing, while RadiOne platforms can provide results in less than one hour. Training of laboratory
personnel on diagnosis, biosafety, post-mortem sampling and safe specimen transport continued.

• Genomic surveillance is ongoing in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with more than 400 Bundibugyo virus
genomic sequences generated and shared through open-access databases to support monitoring of viral
evolution and transmission dynamics.

• Operational challenges persist, including incomplete laboratory reporting, delays in sample transport and return
of results, gaps in data integration, and limited decentralized testing capacity in some transmission areas.

Case Management
• Admissions remained high as transmission continued. As of 9 August 2026, 704 patients were in isolation and
receiving care nationally, against 1,050 available beds, corresponding to an overall bed occupancy rate of 68.8%.
Despite available capacity at the national level, several treatment facilities in Ituri and North Kivu provinces
remained saturated, including the Rwampara, Institut Supérieur des Techniques Médicales (ISTM) and Nizi Ebola
treatment centres and the Bambu transit centre, highlighting geographic disparities in bed availability and
continued pressure on case management services.

• Clinical outcomes continued to improve, with cumulative recoveries reaching 869 by 9 August 2026. During the
previous 24 hours, 18 patients were declared recovered after two negative Ebola test results, including 14 in
Ituri and four in North Kivu.

• Treatment capacity was further expanded during the reporting week with the inauguration of a new 100-bed
Ebola Treatment Centre in Rwankole, near Bunia, Ituri Province, on 4 August 2026. The facility, the largest Ebola
treatment centre established since the start of the outbreak, is expected to strengthen patient isolation and
clinical care and relieve pressure on existing treatment facilities in Ituri.

• Rehabilitation and operationalization of treatment and isolation facilities continued in Musienene and Vuhovi
in North Kivu. Haut-Uélé continued to lack a standardized Ebola treatment centre across its six affected health

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zones.

• Comprehensive in-care support and clinical workforce strengthening continued, including nutritional and
psychosocial support for patients and caregivers, referral and ambulance services, and training in the
management of critically ill patients and use of high-flow oxygen. WHO and partners, including Médecins Sans
Frontières and the World Food Programme, continued to support clinical care, treatment-centre operations,
nutrition and workforce capacity.

• Mental health and psychosocial support continued, reaching 24 newly confirmed cases and 343 caregivers in
Ituri and North Kivu, alongside support for children, families and frontline workers.

Research and Development
• Clinical research on therapeutics continued to expand in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The WHO-
sponsored PARTNERS trial has now enrolled 100 participants, with three sites operational and two additional
sites in the process of activation. The trial is evaluating MBP134, remdesivir and their combination for the
treatment of BVD.

• The EBO-PEP study has enrolled 69 participants and is developing an operational plan for mobile teams to
expand access and enrolment of eligible high-risk contacts. The study is evaluating obeldesivir as a post-
exposure prophylaxis.

• The MBOTE natural history study has also started, further expanding evidence generation on the clinical
characteristics and progression of BVD.

• Vaccine development has progressed to first-in-human evaluation. The University of Oxford launched a Phase I
trial of the ChAdOx1 BDBV vaccine in the United Kingdom on 13 July 2026, targeting 50 healthy adults aged 18
– 55 years, with the first participant vaccinated on 24 July 2026. Approximately 620,000 candidate vaccine doses
have been manufactured, including 4,000 investigational doses for the Phase I programme. Regulatory approval
is awaited for initiation of an additional Oxford Phase I study in adults in Uganda.

• In parallel, Moderna’s mRNA-1469 candidate has entered Phase I evaluation at three sites in Canada, with the
first doses administered to healthy volunteers as of 5 August 2026. The Vaccine Technical Advisory Group has
also prioritized ERVEBO for inclusion as an arm in the planned Phase II/III BVD vaccine trials, with the protocol
in the final stages of development.

• WHO and partners continued to advance the Bundibugyo medical-countermeasure research agenda, including
development of vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics. WHO has published a target product profile for
Bundibugyo vaccines and regulatory considerations to support further development and potential emergency
use.

• WHO and partners are also advancing a vaccine effectiveness evaluation to assess whether previous Ebola
vaccination provides protection against BVD. The protocol is in the final stages of review, while work continues
to compile, clean and harmonize historical vaccination data to support analysis.

• Operational research also continued in Ituri. Five protocols have received ethics approval, three of five planned
studies have been completed, and four of 22 recommendations have been implemented. Current studies
address laboratory-result turnaround times, decision-making processes, and social and behavioural factors, with
findings being translated into response operations.

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Infection Prevention and Control (IPC) and Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH)
• IPC activities continued across affected health facilities and communities. In Ituri, 20 IPC rings were opened on
9 August 2026, and all 47 identified exposure sites were decontaminated. In North Kivu, 45 health facilities
received IPC support, 168 health workers were briefed, and two facilities underwent IPC scorecard assessments.

• Safe and dignified burials (SDBs) continued across affected areas, although community resistance remained a
challenge in some locations. On 9 August, 68 SDBs were conducted following 80 death alerts in Ituri (85.0%),
and 50 bodies were sampled post-mortem. In North Kivu, 37 SDBs were conducted and 38 bodies were secured
for post-mortem sampling.

• Healthcare worker infections remained a major concern, with 155 infections, including 45 deaths reported
among frontline healthcare workers, underscoring persistent occupational exposure and the need to strengthen
adherence to IPC measures in health facilities.

• Training, orientation and supportive supervision continued to strengthen frontline IPC capacity. In North Kivu,
453 health workers received IPC orientation, while facility assessments, supportive supervision,
decontamination and household-level IPC interventions continued across affected areas. However, incomplete
reporting and gaps in IPC implementation remain important operational challenges.

Risk Communication and Community Engagement (RCCE)
• RCCE activities intensified across affected provinces, with a focus on early care-seeking, contact tracing, safe
and dignified burials and community acceptance of response measures. In Ituri, interpersonal communication
addressed risks associated with caregivers, while community ambassadors were briefed in Mongbwalu.

• Targeted engagement expanded among high-risk and mobile populations. In North Kivu, 20 motorcycle-taxi
riders were briefed, 16 rumours were clarified, one community incident was resolved, and 103 household heads
around 21 cases were reached. In Haut-Uélé, 1,231 people were reached through 351 household visits in Isiro,
while 30 motorcycle-taxi drivers were sensitized in Boma-Mangbetu.

• Community feedback and trusted local networks continued to shape response interventions. WHO emphasizes
engagement with traditional and religious leaders, women’s and youth groups, community volunteers and other
trusted actors to identify concerns, counter misinformation and adapt interventions to local realities. Recent
reporting also indicates that community dialogue has improved demand for investigation, safe burials, care and
reliable information in affected areas

• A second round of rapid community assessments has been initiated in two health zones, using interviews and
focus group discussions to identify community perceptions, concerns and barriers to response interventions.

• Persistent mistrust and operational constraints continue to affect community acceptance. Denial of Ebola,
resistance to safe and dignified burials, expectations regarding vaccine availability and non-payment of
community actors remain important challenges, particularly in North Kivu and Haut-Uélé. WHO continues to
emphasize large-scale trust-building, integration of community feedback and engagement of trusted local
leaders as essential to improving adherence to response measures.

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Preventing and Responding to Sexual Exploitation, Abuse, and Harassment (PRSEAH)
• PRSEAH awareness and capacity-building activities continued across affected provinces. In Ituri, North Kivu,
South Kivu and Tshopo, 810 people, including 279 women, participated in orientation sessions targeting
community actors, health care providers, rapid response teams, Provincial Health Division management teams,
religious leaders, surveillance teams and hotel personnel.

• Community awareness activities reached 1,673 people, including 662 women and 170 girls, through targeted
sessions for students, vendors, taxi and motorcycle-taxi drivers, health care providers and community leaders.

• A three-day government-led workshop was conducted to update the national PRSEAH response plan, bringing
together key institutional stakeholders and technical partners to harmonize strategies, strengthen coordination
and update operational procedures for PRSEAH across the outbreak response.

• PRSEAH capacity-building continued for community outreach workers, volunteers and focal points within rapid
response teams. In addition, 18 WHO staff members received PRSEAH induction briefings and signed the WHO
Code of Conduct.

Public health preparedness
Operational Readiness
• Regional preparedness continued to improve during the reporting period. A total of 31 Member States have
completed and submitted their readiness assessment, increasing coverage to 66%. The average readiness score
among Priority 1 and 2 countries remained at 58%.

• A total of six high-priority countries have completed repeat readiness assessments, demonstrating continued
improvements in national preparedness capacities. These include Angola, South Sudan, Tanzania, Kenya,
Rwanda, and Zambia.

• Regional deployments to strengthen preparedness continued in high-risk Member States. These include
Burundi, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and South Sudan.

Border Health, Travel and Mass Gatherings
• Screening and public health measures have been reinforced at airports, high-risk border crossings, and internal
transit routes in both the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda. National authorities, the International
Organization for Migration (IOM), and partners continue to support the implementation of WHO border health
guidance, strengthen cross-border coordination, and facilitate the timely detection, reporting and referral of
suspected cases at PoEs and PoCs along priority travel corridors.

• Cross-border preparedness and response are being strengthened through enhanced coordination among the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, and South Sudan to improve the early detection of cases and reduce
the risk of cross-border spread. Priority actions include strengthening coordinated cross-border disease
surveillance, event-based surveillance, active case finding, joint investigations and contact tracing where

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required, and real-time information sharing through regular cross-border coordination meetings and
harmonized reporting mechanisms.

• Priority operational actions include rapid assessments and mapping of PoEs, strengthening surveillance along
high-risk cross-border mobility corridors, including informal crossings, and major congregation points, and
ensuring readiness capacities through the provision of trained personnel, equipment, PPE, referral mechanisms,
disinfectants, risk communication materials and contingency plans for the safe management of suspected cases

• Mass gathering risk assessment capacity is being strengthened through training and technical support. The
postponement of mass gatherings is advised in areas with documented BVD transmission until transmission is
interrupted, while a risk-based approach is recommended for events held elsewhere in the region.

• Event-specific risk assessments should be conducted using the WHO all-hazards mass gathering risk assessment
tool. These assessments should be complemented by implementation of measures before, during, and after
events, as outlined in WHO guidance for mass gatherings attended by individuals from areas with documented
Bundibugyo virus detection, including the establishment of referral pathways and RT-PCR testing capacity.

• Event organisers should distribute participant information to all attendees before and during the event, covering
BVD symptoms, what to do if feeling unwell, and available health services, in line with WHO guidance for mass
gathering events attended by individuals from areas with documented BDBV detection.

Situation interpretation
The BVD outbreak remains uncontrolled, with transmission continuing to outpace response capacity. Persistent
community deaths, geographic expansion and gaps in contact follow-up indicate continued undetected community
transmission, while pressure on treatment facilities, uneven infection prevention and control capacity, workforce
constraints and community resistance continue to challenge response effectiveness. The response should now shift to
targeted interruption of transmission in the main clusters and emerging hotspots, while deepening community
leadership and ownership of the response. This requires empowering trusted local leaders and community networks to
drive active case finding, contact tracing, early care-seeking, and safe and dignified burials, alongside faster case
investigation and isolation and rapid infection prevention and control interventions. Workforce and payment
constraints require urgent resolution, while neighbouring countries should maintain heightened preparedness given the
continued risk of cross-border spread.

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Contributors Editorial Advisory Group, WHO Regional
Office for Africa
• WILLIAMS, George Sie (WHO AFRO)
• OTSHUDIEMA, John (WHO AFRO) • Dr Marie Roseline Darnycka Belizaire —
• CONTEH, Ishata (WHO AFRO) Regional Emergency Director, EPR/AFRO
• MASINA, John (WHO AFRO)
• MAMADU, Ibrahim (WHO AFRO) • Dr Otim Patrick Ramadan — Programme
• ROQUILLE, Denise (WHO AFRO) Area Manager, EMR/EPR/AFRO &
• MUTEBA, Michel (WHO AFRO)
Deputy Regional Incident Manager, BVD
Response
• DOSHI, Reena Hemendra (WCO AFRO)
• BORIS, Pavlin (WHO HQ)
• HAMBLION, Esther (WHO HQ) • Dr Etien Koua — Programme Area
Manager, HIS/EPR/AFRO
• KASSAMALI, Zyleen (WHO HQ)
• DIAZ, Janet Victoria (WHO HQ)
• ALLAIN IOOS, Sophie (WHO HQ) • Dr Dick Chamla — Programme Area
• HAMOUDA, Mahmoud Aly Zeenelabdin (WHO HQ)
Manager, HEP/EPR/AFRO
• MOLINARO, Paul (WHO HQ)
• LEGAND, Anaïs (WHO HQ) • Mr Adama Thiam — Programme Area
• WAUQUIER, Nadia (WHO HQ) Manager, OSL/EPR/AFRO
• SODAGAR, Vaishali (WHO HQ)
• WANG, Ninglan (WHO HQ)
• SELENIC MINET, Dubravka (WHO HQ)
• ALEXANDROVA EZERSKA, Lidia (WHO HQ)
• MORAN, Thomas (WHO HQ)
• MGAMB, Elizabeth Adhiambo (WCO Uganda)
• FOTSING, Richard (WCO DR Congo)
• AJONG, Brian (WCO DR Congo)

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